ABSTRACT

In parliamentary systems, parliament ensures that the government governs well, and typically parliaments institutionally are empowered to hold the government accountable. This article focuses on MPs Firefighting response to audit Fire Alarms about the government maladministration. Institutions foster expectations and as parliamentarians, MPs are expected to support audit reports. Nevertheless, the strong role of political parties in parliamentary systems fosters partisan expectations and challenges ex-post control activity. MPs activate control institutions when it serves partisan interests. However, this article argues that rules and specific procedures strengthen the institutional ‘non-party’ mode and challenge the partisan logic in parliamentary control activity. The article tests this expectation by an investigation of MPs Firefighting reactive activity to audit Fire Alarms as part of the institutionalised control process related to the Faroese SAI institution and PAC. The results show that MPs in fact to a high degree display parliamentarian behaviour in the institutionalised audit control process.

摘要

在议会制中，议会确保政府治理良好，通常议会在制度上有权要求政府承担责任。这篇文章的重点是国会议员消防响应审计关于政府管理不善的火灾警报。机构培养期望，作为议员，国会议员应该支持审计报告。然而，政党在议会系统中的强大作用会促进党派期望并挑战事后控制活动。国会议员在为党派利益服务时激活控制机构。然而，本文认为规则和具体程序强化了制度性的“非党派”模式，挑战了党派议会控制活动的逻辑。本文通过对国会议员消防反应活动的调查来测试这一预期，以审计火灾警报，作为与法罗群岛 SAI 机构和 PAC 相关的制度化控制过程的一部分。结果表明，在制度化的审计控制过程中，议员实际上在很大程度上表现了议员行为。