ABSTRACT

An important quality of representative democracy is the strength of the linkage between citizens and the state. To provide a strong incentive for this relationship, Ghanaian legislators are elected on First-Past-The-Post system which in principle should foster close links between legislators and their constituents. In contrast to this expectation, there is an observed disconnect between the country’s legislators and their constituents. This paper investigates why Ghana’s electoral system is producing a starkly different outcome and which explanations could account for the gap between the country's representatives and the represented. Previous studies have not assessed patron–client networks mediating legislators’ pathway to power in Ghana and how it complicates the expected effects of electoral institutions. The paper argues that the relationship between legislators and their constituents in Ghana is mediated by the strong presence of clientelistic networks in intra-party primaries that tamper with the constraining effects of formal electoral rules.

摘要

代议制民主的一个重要品质是公民与国家之间联系的强度。为了为这种关系提供强有力的激励，加纳立法者是通过选举产生的，原则上应该促进立法者与其选民之间的密切联系。与这种预期相反，观察到该国立法者与其选民之间存在脱节。本文调查了为什么加纳的选举制度产生了截然不同的结果，以及哪些解释可以解释该国代表与代表之间的差距。以前的研究没有评估在加纳调解立法者权力途径的赞助人 - 客户网络以及它如何使选举制度的预期效果复杂化。