ABSTRACT

Political careerism has long focused on the idea of progressive ambition, rarely using retirements as a measure. The end of a legislator's career can reveal how term limits have changed the institution and legislative behaviour. Term limits, intended to curb legislative careers, have unintentionally led to changes in career ambition. The rate at which members retire is dependent on the type of term limit that a member faces and the institutional incentives to continue service. This comparative analysis uses retirement rates as a proxy for static, career-oriented ambition and reveals that there is a decreased probability of term-limited legislators retiring. The decreasing retirement rate indicates a lesser-known pathway for static ambition. Although ambition is typically viewed as those who move upward, it is also about those who rethink retirement and choose to continue serving.

摘要

长期以来，政治野心主义一直专注于进步的野心，很少将退休作为衡量标准。立法者职业生涯的结束可以揭示任期限制如何改变了制度和立法行为。旨在限制立法职业的任期限制无意中导致了职业抱负的变化。成员退休的比率取决于成员面临的任期限制类型以及继续服务的机构激励措施。这种比较分析使用退休率作为静态的、以职业为导向的雄心的代理，并表明任期有限的立法者退休的可能性降低。退休率的下降表明了一条鲜为人知的静态野心途径。尽管野心通常被视为向上移动的人，