Abstract People have a capacity to imaginatively recreate mental states that they themselves do not have. These recreative states are referred to as ‘I-states’. Several philosophers, such as Gregory Currie, Tyler Doggett, and Andy Egan, propose that the combination of i-desire and i-belief—two typical I-states—can motivate agents. The goal of this paper is to defend this i-desire + i-belief account. Here I consider a kind of dramatic acting—method acting—in which an actor aspires to sincere performances by experientially inhabiting the role of the character, as involving I-states and that it implies that i-desires and i-beliefs can motivate agents. First, I analyze the features of method acting; second, I argue that those accounts which do not include the concept of i-desire cannot explain these features; third, I argue that the i-desire + i-belief account can do that and it therefore is the best explanation of how a method actor is motivated on stage.

中文翻译：

---

成为罗密欧

摘要人们具有想象力地重建他们自己没有的精神状态的能力。这些娱乐状态称为“ I状态”。几位哲学家，例如格雷戈里·柯里，泰勒·多格特和安迪·伊根，都提出将“我的欲望”和“我的信仰”这两个典型的“我的国家”相结合，可以激发行动者。本文的目的是捍卫这个i-desire + i-belief帐户。在这里，我考虑一种戏剧性的表演（方法表演），其中演员渴望通过体验角色的角色来表现真诚的表演（涉及I状态），这意味着i欲望和i信仰可以激发代理人。首先，我分析了方法代理的特点；第二，我认为那些不包含i-desire概念的描述不能解释这些特征。第三，