ABSTRACT

Although Kant is clearly committed to some version of the Guise of the Good thesis (GG), he only explicitly endorses a very weak version of it; namely, that under the direction of reason, we only pursue what we conceive to be good. This version of thesis seems to allow that human beings might act in defiance of reason’s directives, and that if they did so, they would not necessarily be engaging in actions that they conceive to be good in any way. In fact, Kant’s discussions of pathological motivation and his understanding of imperatives seem to preclude any stronger reading. Despite this evidence, many interpreters, relying on Kant’s discussion of self-conceit and the ‘incorporation thesis’, assume that Kant’s commitment to GG extends to all actions; on this interpretation, even immoral actions are pursued under the guise of the good. I argue that the reasoning typically provided in favor of this interpretation is neither compatible with Kant’s hedonism regarding non-moral motives nor with his commitment to the epistemic priority of our awareness of moral law over our awareness of freedom. However, the textual evidence that Kant accepted a more extensive version of GG is indeed compelling. I propose that Kant holds the stronger version of GG on distinctively moral grounds; the nature of our awareness of the moral law implies that evil is pursued under the guise of the good.

摘要

尽管康德显然致力于某种形式的“善意指南”（GG），但他只明确地认可了它的一个很弱的版本。也就是说，在理性的指导下，我们只追求我们认为好的东西。这个论点的版本似乎允许人类可能会违背理性的指示行事，而且如果这样做，他们不一定会以任何方式从事他们认为是有益的行动。实际上，康德对病理动机的讨论和对命令的理解似乎排除了任何更强的理解。尽管有这些证据，许多口译员仍依赖于康德对自负和“合并论”的讨论，认为康德对GG的承诺扩展到了所有行动。根据这种解释，即使是不道德的行为也要以善为幌子进行。我认为，通常支持这种解释的推理既不符合康德关于非道德动机的享乐主义，也不符合康德对我们对道德法的认识比对自由的认识的认识论优先地位的承诺。但是，康德接受更广泛版本的GG的文字证据确实令人信服。我建议康德根据独特的道德理由持有更强的GG版本。我们对道德律的认识的本质意味着，邪恶是在善的幌子下追求的。康德接受更广泛版本的GG的文字证据确实令人信服。我建议康德根据独特的道德理由持有更强的GG版本。我们对道德律的认识的本质意味着，邪恶是在善的幌子下追求的。康德接受更广泛版本的GG的文字证据确实令人信服。我建议康德根据独特的道德理由持有更强的GG版本。我们对道德律的认识的本质意味着，邪恶是在善的幌子下追求的。