ABSTRACT

In the first edition of the Essay, Locke argued that we pursue whatever course of action we judge to be the best option available to us at the time. In other words, we always act under the guise of the good. Faced with empirical counter-examples, in the second edition he renounced this view in favor of a complex psychology involving desire and suspension. That we may not be motivated by the apparent good is a way in which we diverge from ideal rationality. But although determination by the good becomes aspirational in the second edition and later, Locke has not abandoned the guise of the good altogether. We may not always pursue what we see as good after mature deliberation, but we do always pursue what we see as good at the moment of action, under the influences of habit, emotion, and perspectival distortion.

摘要

洛克在《散文》的第一版中指出，我们会采取我们认为是当时可用的最佳选择的任何行动方案。换句话说，我们始终以善良为幌子行事。面对经验上的反例，他在第二版中放弃了这种观点，转而支持涉及欲望和中止的复杂心理学。我们可能不会被表面上的利益所驱使，这是我们偏离理想理性的一种方式。但是，尽管在第二版及以后的版本中，由善良的决定成为理想，但洛克并未完全放弃善良的幌子。在成熟的讨论之后，我们可能并不总是追求我们认为好的东西，但是在习惯，情感和透视畸变的影响下，我们总是会在行动时追求我们认为好的东西。