ABSTRACT

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz endorses a version of the guise of the good thesis: he holds that whenever we do something intentionally, we do it because it seems good to us. This paper explores Leibniz’s version of this thesis and its implications for other aspects of his system. More specifically, the paper investigates the modal status of Leibniz’s thesis, the question of whether it leaves room for akrasia, or weakness of the will, and finally, the question of whether Leibniz is able to provide satisfactory explanations of truly evil actions.

中文翻译：

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莱布尼兹的商品伪装

摘要

戈特弗里德·威廉·莱布尼兹（Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz）认可了良好论点的假装：他认为，每当我们有意地做某事时，我们都会这样做，因为它对我们来说似乎是件好事。本文探讨了莱布尼兹的这篇论文的版本及其对系统其他方面的启示。更具体地说，本文研究了莱布尼兹论点的模态状态，是否留有空想的余地或意志薄弱的问题，最后是莱布尼兹能否为真正的邪恶行为提供令人满意的解释的问题。