This article demonstrates that a secondary market for U.S. variable annuity policies may be immediately welfare enhancing to all parties involved: the insurer, the original policyholder, and a third-party investor. Our model reflects relevant market frictions—here, the product’s tax benefits—that produce differing valuation perspectives for the three parties. This allows for policy transfers that benefit all parties simultaneously, including the insurance company, irrespective of the level of control that it exerts over this secondary market. We illustrate our insights first with a theoretical two-period model, followed by an empirically motivated numerical analysis. Our numerical results suggest a best-estimate total welfare gain of 2.6% of the initial investment amount under the optimal secondary market structure.

本文表明，美国可变年金保单的二级市场可能会立即提高所有相关方的福利：保险公司、原始保单持有人和第三方投资者。我们的模型反映了相关的市场摩擦——这里是产品的税收优惠——为三方产生不同的估值观点。这允许同时使包括保险公司在内的所有各方受益的保单转移，而不管它对该二级市场施加的控制水平如何。我们首先用一个理论的两期模型来说明我们的见解，然后是一个以经验为动机的数值分析。我们的数值结果表明，在最优二级市场结构下，初始投资金额的 2.6% 的最佳估计总福利收益。