Abstract

Why, in May 1970, did Japan participate – for the first time in the post-World War II era – in an international conference for the resolution of a conflict? Cold War-era Japan has often been described as shying away from involvement in international political affairs, especially in Asia, where memories of Japanese wartime aggression were still rankling. Yet, in 1970, when conflict erupted in Cambodia, Tokyo made its debut at a multilateral peacemaking endeavour: a conference bringing Asian and Pacific countries together in Jakarta to tackle the Cambodian problem. It is also puzzling that despite domestic opposition to the dispatch of a Japanese delegation to Jakarta, Prime Minister Eisaku Satō’s government went ahead with Japanese attendance there. This article draws on declassified diplomatic documents in its investigation of the circumstances behind that unprecedented development in Japanese diplomacy. The findings reveal that amid the changes in Asia triggered by Washington’s new policy of reduced engagement in the region, a more confident Japan was acting for peace in Cambodia, seeking not only to assume a larger regional role, but also to ensure the smooth realisation of two priority agendas of the Satō administration: the Okinawa reversion and the automatic extension of the Japan-U.S. security treaty.

摘要

为什么日本在 1970 年 5 月参加了二战后第一次解决冲突的国际会议？冷战时期的日本经常被描述为回避参与国际政治事务，尤其是在亚洲，日本战时侵略的记忆仍然令人心痛。然而，1970 年，当柬埔寨爆发冲突时，东京在多边和平努力中首次亮相：亚洲和太平洋国家在雅加达召开会议，共同解决柬埔寨问题。同样令人费解的是，尽管日本国内反对派遣日本代表团前往雅加达，首相佐藤荣作政府却坚持让日本人出席。本文利用解密的外交文件来调查日本外交史无前例的发展背后的情况。调查结果显示，在华盛顿减少参与该地区的新政策引发的亚洲变化中，更加自信的日本正在为柬埔寨的和平而行动，不仅寻求承担更大的地区作用，而且确保顺利实现佐藤政府的两大优先议程：冲绳归还和日美安保条约自动延期。