ABSTRACT

We test the hypothesis that public banks reduce monetary policy power. Previous studies have shown that companies with access to government-driven credit present smaller fall in investment and production after a contractionary monetary policy shock. Nevertheless, these studies are based on microeconomic data and ignore macroeconomic effects, especially the cost-push effects, of monetary policy. We employ state-dependent local projections to compare monetary policy power – the sensibility of inflation to changes in policy interest rate – between periods of high credit of public banks and periods of high credit of private banks. We do not find evidence that monetary policy is less powerful in periods of high credit of public banks. Even though periods of high credit of public banks present a lower effect over output, those periods present less persistent price puzzles than periods of high private credit. Robustness of results is enhanced by performing several tests. We attribute our results to lower flexibility in interest rates of credit from public banks, what leads to lower transmission in financial costs, lower reduction in capital stock and lower variation in the exchange rate.

摘要

我们检验了公共银行降低货币政策权力的假设。先前的研究表明，在紧缩性货币政策冲击之后，能够获得政府驱动的信贷的公司的投资和生产下降幅度较小。然而，这些研究基于微观经济数据，忽略了货币政策的宏观经济效应，尤其是成本推动效应。我们采用依赖于国家的地方预测来比较公共银行高信贷时期和私人银行高信贷时期的货币政策力量——通货膨胀对政策利率变化的敏感性。我们没有发现证据表明在公共银行的高信用时期货币政策不那么强大。尽管公共银行的高信贷期对产出的影响较小，与私人信贷高的时期相比，这些时期出现的价格难题较少。通过执行多项测试，结果的稳健性得以增强。我们将我们的结果归因于公共银行信贷利率的灵活性较低，这导致金融成本传导较低、资本存量减少较少以及汇率波动较小。