ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is to consider whether, by thinking of our ethical relation to one another in terms of vulnerability, we can better resolve the problem of overdemandingness – namely, that certain moral views and theories seem to require more of us than is reasonably acceptable. I will suggest that there is a way in which focusing on vulnerability, rather than merely needs or wants, can help address the issue of overdemandingness, largely because of the relational nature of vulnerability, and how this connects to our power over others. In arguing this case, I will draw on the work of the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup. I explore how Løgstrup shows how this might work in relation to a central form of vulnerability which he emphasises, namely trust. I then consider an objection, namely that trust is a rather special case of vulnerability, which is less open to the problem of overdemandingness only because it has particular features which do not apply to vulnerability more generally. I then respond to this objection by considering if lessons learnt from the case of trust could still nonetheless be extended more widely to other forms of vulnerability. Doing so, I will suggest, might show how thinking in terms of vulnerability as Løgstrup conceives it can help us with the problem of overdemandingness

中文翻译：

---

脆弱性、信任和过度要求：来自 Løgstrup 的反思

摘要 我在这篇论文中的目的是考虑，通过从脆弱性的角度考虑我们彼此之间的伦理关系，我们是否可以更好地解决过分要求的问题——即某些道德观点和理论似乎对我们的要求比实际需要的更多。合理可接受。我将建议，有一种方法可以让关注脆弱性，而不仅仅是需求或欲望，可以帮助解决过分要求的问题，这主要是因为脆弱性的关系性质，以及这如何与我们对他人的权力联系起来。在论证这个案例时，我将借鉴丹麦哲学家和神学家 KE Løgstrup 的工作。我探索了 Løgstrup 如何展示这如何与他强调的一种核心脆弱性形式相关，即信任。然后我考虑一个反对意见，也就是说，信任是脆弱性的一种相当特殊的情况，它对过度要求的问题不太开放，只是因为它具有不更普遍地适用于脆弱性的特定特征。然后，我通过考虑从信任案例中吸取的经验教训是否仍然可以更广泛地扩展到其他形式的脆弱性来回应这一反对意见。这样做，我会建议，可能会表明 Løgstrup 认为的脆弱性思考如何帮助我们解决过分要求的问题 然后，我通过考虑从信任案例中吸取的经验教训是否仍然可以更广泛地扩展到其他形式的脆弱性来回应这一反对意见。这样做，我会建议，可能会表明 Løgstrup 认为的脆弱性思考如何帮助我们解决过分要求的问题 然后，我通过考虑从信任案例中吸取的经验教训是否仍然可以更广泛地扩展到其他形式的脆弱性来回应这一反对意见。这样做，我会建议，可能会表明 Løgstrup 认为的脆弱性思考如何帮助我们解决过分要求的问题