ABSTRACT In developing her ethics of care, Eva Kittay discusses the vulnerability and voluntarism models of obligation. Kittay uses the vulnerability model to demonstrate that we have some obligations to care, even for those to whom we’ve made no promise or with whom we have no agreement. Kittay’s primary interest is in our moral obligations. I use this distinction to propose a new way to understand our epistemic obligations to one another. After explaining Kittay’s models and their epistemic analogs, I use epistemic vulnerability to explain two cases.

中文翻译：

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认知漏洞

摘要 在发展她的护理伦理时，Eva Kittay 讨论了义务的脆弱性和自愿性模型。Kittay 使用漏洞模型来证明我们有一些义务去关心，即使是那些我们没有承诺或没有同意的人。Kittay 的主要兴趣在于我们的道德义务。我利用这一区别提出了一种新的方式来理解我们对彼此的认知义务。在解释了 Kittay 的模型及其认知类比之后，我使用认知脆弱性来解释两个案例。