ABSTRACT

In this paper, I show that Kant’s solution to the third antinomy is a reply sui generis to the consequence argument. If sound, the consequence argument yields that we are not morally responsible for our actions because our actions are not up to us. After expounding the modal version of the consequence argument advanced by Peter van Inwagen, I show that Kant accepts the inference rules of the argument and a requirement of alternate possibilities for moral blame. Kant must therefore reject one of the premises of the consequence argument to be able to deny its conclusion. Whereas Kantian altered-past compatibilism denies the premise of the consequence argument which states the fixity of the past, Kantian altered-law compatibilism denies the premise that states the fixity of the laws of nature. My analysis shows that Kantian altered-past and altered-law compatibilism are logically consistent, yet it also reveals that they depend on strong metaphysical premises. It must be investigated whether these premises withstand textual scrutiny and whether they are credible in their own right. By way of conclusion, I draw the outlines of this investigation.

摘要

在这篇论文中，我展示了康德对第三个二律背反的解决方案是一个自成一格的答复到后果论点。如果合理，后果论证会得出我们不为自己的行为承担道德责任，因为我们的行为不取决于我们。在阐述了 Peter van Inwagen 提出的后果论证的模态版本之后，我表明康德接受论证的推理规则和道德责备的替代可能性的要求。因此，康德必须拒绝结果论证的前提之一才能否定其结论。康德的改变过去的相容论否认陈述过去的固定性的后果论证的前提，而康德的改变的法律相容论否认陈述自然规律的固定性的前提。我的分析表明，康德式的改变过去和改变律相容论在逻辑上是一致的，然而，这也表明它们依赖于强大的形而上学前提。必须调查这些前提是否经得起文本审查，以及它们本身是否可信。作为结论，我勾勒出这次调查的轮廓。