ABSTRACT Spinoza argues that there is one substance, God, with at least two distinct attributes. On Objective Interpretations, the “attributes” are what God conceives of God’s own essence. Because God truly conceives the attributes as distinct, it must be that they are in some sense distinct. However, several of Spinoza’s texts suggest that God is identical with God’s attributes. How can one God be identical with two or more distinct attributes? I will argue that no Objective Interpretation can plausibly make sense of Spinoza’s identification of substance and attributes. I argue that the solution to this Identity Puzzle is understanding that “attributes” are what the finite human intellect conceives of God’s essence. Though we can conceive God’s attributes as distinct, they are not thereby ontologically distinct. On my interpretation, the distinction we conceive between the attributes is a distinction in the reasoning we use to arrive at a highly adequate idea of God. While we may use distinct attribute names for God to mark the distinct origins of this idea in our reasoning, these names do not correspond to a distinction in God. In this way, each of the attributes is identical with God.

中文翻译：

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斯宾诺莎的实体与属性的统一

摘要 斯宾诺莎认为存在一种实体，即上帝，它至少具有两种不同的属性。在客观解释中，“属性”是上帝对上帝自身本质的构想。因为上帝确实认为这些属性是不同的，所以它们在某种意义上肯定是不同的。然而，斯宾诺莎的一些文本表明上帝与上帝的属性相同。一位神怎么可能与两个或更多不同的属性相同？我会争辩说，没有任何客观解释能够合理地理解斯宾诺莎对实质和属性的认同。我认为这个身份谜题的解决方案是理解“属性”是有限的人类智力对上帝本质的看法。虽然我们可以将上帝的属性设想为不同的，但它们在本体论上并不是不同的。根据我的解释，我们所设想的属性之间的区别是我们用来得出非常充分的上帝观念的推理的区别。虽然我们可以使用上帝的不同属性名称来标记我们推理中这个想法的不同起源，但这些名称并不对应于上帝的区别。这样，每个属性都与上帝相同。