ABSTRACT

In Principes de Politique (1815), Benjamin Constant offers a blueprint for later liberal attempts to retain a commitment to popular sovereignty, while moderating its absolutist tendencies and associations with arbitrary political power. This paper examines some notable tensions, still relevant today, in Constant’s domesticated liberal concept of popular sovereignty. These tensions, I contend, all point to the conclusion that Constant’s project of limiting popular sovereignty by appeal to a sacrosanct domain of rights rests on a liberal interpretation of the general will, which is in fact constitutive for the enjoyment of individual liberties. Section 2 argues that Constant’s location of popular sovereignty in the legislative general will, as determined by elected representatives, does not overcome the problem of the potential arrogation of the popular will by a partisan minority. Section 3 then examines Constant’s views on rights and the implications of his acknowledgement that the enjoyment of liberties depends upon the institutional guarantee provided by constitutional enactment. Finally, in section 4, I demonstrate that Constant’s valorization of individual self-development is inseparable from an idea of political liberty which reflects the priorities of a liberal elite.

摘要

在壮年兵德Politique(1815)，本杰明·康斯坦 (Benjamin Constant) 为后来的自由主义尝试保留对人民主权的承诺提供了蓝图，同时缓和了其专制主义倾向和与任意政治权力的联系。本文考察了康斯坦斯驯化的自由主义人民主权概念中的一些显着的紧张局势，这些紧张局势在今天仍然适用。我认为，这些紧张关系都指向这样一个结论：康斯坦德通过诉诸神圣的权利领域来限制人民主权的计划依赖于对公意的自由解释，而公意实际上是享受个人自由的组成部分。Section 2 argues that Constant's location of popular sovereignty in the legislative general will, as determined by elected representatives, 并没有克服少数党派可能对民意的僭越问题。然后，第 3 节考察了康斯坦特关于权利的观点，以及他承认自由的享受取决于宪法颁布所提供的制度保障的含义。最后，在第 4 节中，我证明康斯坦特对个人自我发展的价值化与反映自由主义精英优先事项的政治自由观念密不可分。