ABSTRACT

In this paper, I criticize the thesis that value-laden approaches in American philosophy of science were marginalized in the 1960s through the editorial policy at Philosophy of Science and funding practices at the National Science Foundation. I argue that there is no available evidence of any normative restriction on philosophy of science as a domain of inquiry which excluded research on the relation between science and society. Instead, I claim that the absence of any exemplary, professional philosopher who discussed the relation between science and society sufficed to narrow the focus of philosophers of science, given the institutional stabilization of the domain within professional philosophy from 1959 onwards.

摘要

在这篇论文中，我批评了 1960 年代通过科学哲学的编辑政策和美国国家科学基金会的资助实践，美国科学哲学中的价值负载方法被边缘化的论点。我认为，没有任何可用证据表明，科学哲学作为一个研究领域，排除了对科学与社会之间关系的研究，存在任何规范性限制。相反，我声称，考虑到 1959 年以来专业哲学领域的制度稳定，没有任何讨论科学与社会之间关系的模范专业哲学家足以缩小科学哲学家的关注范围。