ABSTRACT

According to comparativism, comparative confidence is more fundamental than absolute confidence. In two recent AJP papers, Stefánsson has argued that comparativism is capable of explaining interpersonal confidence comparisons. In this paper, I will argue that Stefansson’s proposed explanation is inadequate; that we have good reasons to think that comparativism cannot handle interpersonal comparisons; and that the best explanation of interpersonal comparisons requires thinking about confidence in a fundamentally different way than that which comparativists propose: specifically, we should think of confidence as a dimensionless quantity.

中文翻译：

---

在信心的人际比较中什么是“真实的”

摘要

根据比较主义，比较信心比绝对信心更重要。在最近的两篇AJP论文中，Stefánsson 认为比较主义能够解释人际信心比较。在本文中，我将争辩说 Stefansson 提出的解释是不充分的。我们有充分的理由认为比较主义无法处理人际比较；对人际比较的最佳解释需要以一种与比较主义者提出的完全不同的方式来思考信心：具体而言，我们应该将信心视为一个无量纲的量。