ABSTRACT

This paper identifies a number of questions that any plausible theory of epistemic blame ought to answer. What is epistemic blame? When is someone an appropriate target of epistemic blame? And what justifies engaging in epistemic blame? I argue that a number of problems arise when we try to answer these questions by using existing conceptions of moral blame. I then consider and reject Brown’s [2020 Brown, Jessica 2020. What Is Epistemic Blame? Noûs 54/2: 389–407.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]] belief-desire model of epistemic blame. Finally, I argue that an agency-cultivation model of moral responsibility is not only able to help us to develop a plausible theory of epistemic blame; it is particularly well-placed to do so.

摘要

本文确定了许多问题，任何似是而非的认知责备理论都应该回答这些问题。什么是认知责备？什么时候某人是认知责备的合适目标？什么证明进行认知责备是正当的？我认为，当我们试图通过使用现有的道德责备概念来回答这些问题时，会出现许多问题。然后我考虑并拒绝了布朗的 [ 2020 布朗，杰西卡 2020。什么是认知责备？ Noûs 54/2: 389 - 407。[Crossref], [Web of Science®], [  Google Scholar] ] 认知责备的信念-欲望模型。最后，我认为道德责任的能动性培养模型不仅能够帮助我们发展一种似是而非的认知责备理论；它特别适合这样做。