ABSTRACT

On the traditional picture, accidents must inhere in substances in order to exist. Berkeley famously argues that a particular class of accidents—the sensible qualities—are mere ideas—entities that depend for their existence on minds. To defend this view, Berkeley provides us with an elegant alternative to the traditional framework: sensible qualities depend on a mind, not in virtue of inhering in it, but in virtue of being perceived by it. This metaphysical insight, once correctly understood, gives us the resources to solve a central problem that still plagues the philosophy of perception—the problem of how, given the power of the mind to create phenomenally rich experiences, ordinary perception can nonetheless be said to acquaint us with the mind-independent world.

摘要

在传统的图片中，事故必须存在于物质中才能存在。伯克利著名地认为，一类特殊的事故——可感知的品质——仅仅是想法——它们的存在依赖于思想的实体。为了捍卫这一观点，伯克利为我们提供了传统框架的优雅替代方案：可感知的品质取决于心灵，不是因为内在，而是因为被它感知。这种形而上学的洞察力一旦被正确理解，就会为我们提供解决仍然困扰着感知哲学的核心问题的资源——这个问题，考虑到心灵的力量来创造非凡的丰富体验，普通的感知仍然可以说是熟悉的我们与心灵独立的世界。