ABSTRACT

This paper defends a controversial view about personal identity. It argues that it is possible to endorse both Phenomenalism and Materialism about persons. Phenomenalism is the view that personal identity is grounded in phenomenal consciousness. Materialism is the view that we are material objects. Many believe that the two views are incompatible. In this paper, I show that it is possible to accept both. I consider two objections against their combination—the argument from disembodiment and an important objection by Tim Bayne. My responses are based on Kripke’s analysis of necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori statements. I make the case that both objections rest on different kinds of modal illusions. This strategy can be applied to other arguments, and the paper is intended to advocate a general approach to personal identity.

摘要

本文为关于个人身份的一个有争议的观点辩护。它认为有可能同时认可关于人的现象主义和唯物主义。现象主义认为个人身份建立在现象意识的基础上。唯物主义认为我们是物质对象。许多人认为这两种观点是不相容的。在本文中，我表明可以同时接受两者。我考虑了两种反对将它们结合起来的反对意见——脱离实体的论点和蒂姆·贝恩的重要反对意见。我的回答是基于克里普克对必然的后验和偶然的先验的分析声明。我认为这两种反对意见都基于不同类型的模态幻觉。这种策略可以应用于其他论点，本文旨在提倡对个人身份的一般方法。