ABSTRACT

Cognitive penetrability refers to the possibility that perceptual experiences are influenced by our beliefs, expectations, emotions, or other personal-level mental states. In this paper, I focus on the epistemological implication of cognitive penetration, and examine how, exactly, aetiologies matter to the justificatory power of perceptual experiences. I examine a prominent theory, according to which some cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences are like conclusions of bad inferences. Whereas one version of this theory is psychologically implausible, the other version has sceptical consequences. In the second half of the paper, I suggest an alternative theory, drawing on recent empirical research on imagining-perception interaction and the epistemology of imagining.

摘要

认知渗透性是指知觉体验受我们的信念、期望、情绪或其他个人层面的心理状态影响的可能性。在本文中，我将重点放在认知渗透的认识论含义上，并研究病因学对感知经验的证明力究竟有何影响。我研究了一个著名的理论，根据该理论，一些被认知渗透的知觉体验就像是错误推理的结论。虽然该理论的一个版本在心理上是不可信的，但另一个版本却产生了怀疑的后果。在论文的后半部分，我提出了一种替代理论，借鉴了最近关于想象-知觉相互作用和想象认识论的实证研究。