ABSTRACT

We allow for the possibility of revenge in attacker-defender conflicts under a variety of settings including, for example, when one of the players faces a no-win situation. In a two-player two-period conflict where revenge stems from the grievances of one of the parties to the original conflict, we show that the presence of revenge can influence the amount of effort devoted to the conflict and may in certain circumstances, exacerbate it. We also give conditions when the presence of revenge can deter an attack altogether.

中文翻译：

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冲突中复仇的存在和完全威慑的可能性

摘要

我们允许在各种设置下的攻击者与防御者冲突中进行报复的可能性，例如，当其中一名玩家面临不赢的情况时。在两人两阶段的冲突中，复仇源于原始冲突一方的不满，我们表明，复仇的存在会影响为冲突付出的努力，在某些情况下，可能会加剧它. 我们还给出了复仇的存在可以完全阻止攻击的条件。