This paper investigates whether shareholder value is affected by non-compliance with the prescriptions of a principle-based ‘comply or explain’ system of corporate governance in the context of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. Using System Generalized Method of Moments estimates to control for different types of endogeneity, the main findings of this paper suggest that non-compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code adversely affects shareholder value. Furthermore, ex-post estimates reveal that compliance with certain corporate governance mechanisms is more beneficial than others. With regard to this, compliance with provisions related to board independence is more important than complying with performance-related pay requirements of the code. These findings have implications for policy makers and financial institutions regarding the usefulness of compliance with a prescribed code of corporate governance, specifically during periods of financial distress.

中文翻译：

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金融危机期间合规或不合规：重要吗？

本文研究了在 2007 年至 2009 年全球金融危机的背景下，不遵守基于原则的“遵守或解释”公司治理体系的规定是否会影响股东价值。本文的主要研究结果表明，使用系统广义矩量法估计来控制不同类型的内生性，不遵守英国公司治理准则会对股东价值产生不利影响。此外，事后估计表明，遵守某些公司治理机制比其他机制更有利。就此而言，遵守与董事会独立性相关的规定比遵守守则中与绩效相关的薪酬要求更为重要。