We investigate job design problems in relational contracting environments with multitasking and an aggregated and distorted performance measurement. Compared to assigning all the tasks to a single agent, assigning the tasks to multiple agents mitigates misallocation of effort among the tasks but tightens the self‐enforcing constraint. Consequently, task separation is optimal if and only if the discount factor is high. Some tasks may not be assigned to the agents at all under the optimal job design. When the principal provides explicit incentives as well, it may be the case that task bundling is suboptimal for any discount factor.

中文翻译：

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关系合同中的多任务处理和工作设计*

我们通过多任务处理以及聚合和失真的绩效评估来研究关系合同环境中的工作设计问题。与将所有任务分配给单个代理程序相比，将任务分配给多个代理程序可以减轻任务之间的工作分配不当，但是会加强自我实施的约束。因此，当且仅当折扣系数高时，任务分离才是最佳的。在最佳作业设计下，某些任务可能根本不会分配给座席。当委托人也提供明确的激励措施时，对于任何折扣因素，任务捆绑可能都是次优的。