We study ‘Akerlof economies’, that is, economies where goods come in qualities unknown to buyers, and sellers’ quality can be ranked. Cross-subsidies at the constrained efficient allocation arise, even when there are few high-quality types in the economy. Thus, Akerlof’s markets are poorly suited to deliver constrained efficient outcomes. We then design a competitive market for mechanisms. Agents buy lottery tickets to enter mechanisms, and the price system clears the markets. Firms offer tickets to mechanisms on the basis of ‘input’ prices which, unlike in Akerlof’s competitive markets, are quality dependent. Under standard sorting conditions, we show that a ‘no-price-cut’ competitive equilibrium exists and is incentive efficient.

我们研究的是“阿克洛夫经济”，即那些商品具有买方不知道的品质并且可以对卖方的品质进行排名的经济。即使经济中很少有高质量的类型，也会在有效分配受限的情况下产生交叉补贴。因此，阿克洛夫（Akerlof）的市场不适合交付受限的有效结果。然后，我们为机制设计一个竞争市场。代理商购买彩票以进入机制，然后价格系统清除市场。与“阿克洛夫”的竞争性市场不同，企业根据“投入”价格提供机制的入场券，而价格取决于质量。在标准的分类条件下，我们表明存在“不降价”的竞争均衡并且具有激励效率。