Abstract

Threatening to withhold Jewish divorce in order to extract concessions, which I term here the “get-threat,” is widely regarded as extortionist. Yet this view is commonly associated with skepticism towards agreements stemming from unequal bargaining power, or with a progressive view of the proper divorce regime. Building on contemporary discussions of what is known as “the paradox of blackmail” this article argues that in many cases get-threats should be regarded as simple cases of extortion even by libertarians and conservatives. It then presents and analyzes the best possible statement of defense for the practice of get-threats, designed for the “reasonable reactionary,” showing that even from that point of view get-threats should be limited in scope and magnitude to a narrow range of cases of justified, reasonable demands. The article thus offers both a precise analysis of a longstanding debate and a normative argument for its proper resolution.

中文翻译：

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“威胁”的道德：以离婚为敲诈勒索

摘要

威胁，以保留犹太人的离婚提取让步，这是我长期这里的“ GET -threat，”被广泛视为勒索。然而，这种观点通常与对源自不平等议价能力的协议的怀疑或与适当离婚制度的渐进观点相关。对所谓的“勒索的悖论”当代讨论构建本文认为，在许多情况下得到-threats应该算是甚至自由主义者和保守派敲诈勒索简单的情况。然后，它针对get的实践提出并分析了最佳的辩护声明。为“合理的反动派”设计的“威胁”表明，即使从这种角度来看，“威胁”也应在范围和大小上限制在合理的合理要求的情况下。因此，本文既提供了对长期辩论的精确分析，也提供了对其适当解决的规范性论点。