ABSTRACT This article explores the reasons behind Canada’s declining participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations. It proposes a decision-making model that explains how politicians assess opportunities to commit personnel to peacekeeping missions by balancing their policy objectives with the pressures of electoral politics. Emphasizing the importance of voters in political decision-making processes, it argues that participation in peacekeeping is dependent on three key factors: a belief in the value of peacekeeping in principle; a belief in the value of a given peacekeeping operation; and risk aversion in response to the potential costs of peacekeeping. Tracing Canada’s declining participation in peacekeeping operations since the 1990s, it particularly focuses on how this calculus has, in different ways, limited Canada’s involvement in peacekeeping under Stephen Harper’s Conservative government and Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government, arguing that the former undervalued peacekeeping as a means of obtaining its foreign policy objectives and as a feature of national identity, minimizing the perceived benefits of participation, while the latter has focused on the inherent risks of peacekeeping despite a professed commitment to peacekeeping in principle, maximizing the perceived costs of further personnel commitments. The decisions of successive Canadian governments have led to a free-rider problem in which Canada is willing to enjoy the benefits of peacekeeping but unwilling to bear the costs.

中文翻译：

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“政治决策与加拿大维和的衰落”

摘要 本文探讨了加拿大参与联合国维和行动减少的原因。它提出了一个决策模型，该模型解释了政治家如何通过平衡其政策目标与选举政治的压力来评估将人员投入维和任务的机会。它强调选民在政治决策过程中的重要性，认为参与维和取决于三个关键因素：原则上相信维和的价值；相信特定维和行动的价值；和风险规避，以应对维和的潜在成本。追溯加拿大自 1990 年代以来参与维和行动的减少，它特别关注这种演算如何以不同的方式，在斯蒂芬·哈珀的保守党政府和贾斯汀·特鲁多的自由党政府领导下，限制加拿大参与维和，认为前者低估了维和作为实现其外交政策目标的一种手段和国家认同的特征，最大限度地减少了参与的可感知利益，而后者则尽管公开承诺原则上维持和平，但仍关注维持和平的内在风险，最大限度地提高进一步人员承诺的成本。历届加拿大政府的决定导致了一个搭便车问题，即加拿大愿意享受维和带来的好处，但不愿意承担代价。认为前者低估了维持和平作为实现其外交政策目标的一种手段和国家认同的特征，最大限度地减少了参与的可感知利益，而后者则将重点放在了维持和平的固有风险上，尽管它声称原则上致力于维持和平，最大化进一步人员承诺的感知成本。历届加拿大政府的决定导致了一个搭便车问题，即加拿大愿意享受维和带来的好处，但不愿意承担代价。认为前者低估了维持和平作为实现其外交政策目标的一种手段和国家认同的特征，最大限度地减少了参与的可感知利益，而后者则将重点放在了维持和平的固有风险上，尽管它声称原则上致力于维持和平，最大化进一步人员承诺的感知成本。历届加拿大政府的决定导致了一个搭便车问题，即加拿大愿意享受维和带来的好处，但不愿意承担代价。最大化进一步人员承诺的感知成本。历届加拿大政府的决定导致了一个搭便车问题，即加拿大愿意享受维和带来的好处，但不愿意承担代价。最大化进一步人员承诺的感知成本。历届加拿大政府的决定导致了一个搭便车问题，即加拿大愿意享受维和带来的好处，但不愿意承担代价。