ABSTRACT Hungary and Poland have started their illiberal remodelling in 2010 and 2015 respectively. Both governments routinely apply the illiberal version of the Rule of Law (illiberal legality), which involves that every situation has the potential to be exploited for political gain. Both states opportunistically apply their constitutions and selectively invoke favourable constitutional provisions. And yet, this paper claims that the Hungarian Fundamental Law and the Polish Constitution are equipped with adequate emergency measures to provide for a proper framework for emergency legislation. In illiberal emergency constitutionalism, Hungary uses and abuses its Fundamental Law, while Poland is disregarding its binding 1997 Constitution and, at the same time, creates its new invisible illiberal constitution. This paper explores how it is done during the current human pandemic crisis by focusing on, first, the emergency regimes the constitutions provide for and their (non-)application. Second, it compares the operation of the parliaments as the Sejm chaotically passes crisis management related omnibus legislation and amendments on the presidential election during the extra-constitutional ‘state of epidemic’. The Hungarian Parliament operates under the ‘danger of crisis’. Yet, it still delivers regular legislative activities, as the emergency ‘legislation’ is done through governmental decree as per the Coronavirus Act 2020, which is unconstitutional. These phenomena necessitate an in-depth inquiry about the nature, form, and content of the Hungarian and Polish emergency legislation and governmental decrees. It is concluded that, under normal circumstances, the Hungarian and Polish constitutional measures set for guiding the authorities in emergencies are adequate. In the current political and constitutional setting and COVID-19 crisis, the form and the content of some essential Hungarian and Polish emergency measures stay below standards. It is a further warning sign for the European community to take Hungarian and Poland illiberal constitutionalism seriously. Their pushing the envelope will not end by itself.

中文翻译：

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匈牙利和波兰的 COVID-19：特殊情况和不自由的宪政

摘要 匈牙利和波兰分别于 2010 年和 2015 年开始了他们的非自由改造。两国政府通常都采用非自由版本的法治（非自由合法性），这涉及到每种情况都有可能被利用以谋取政治利益。两个州都机会主义地适用其宪法，并有选择地援引有利的宪法条款。然而，本文声称匈牙利基本法和波兰宪法配备了足够的紧急措施，为紧急立法提供了适当的框架。在非自由紧急宪政中，匈牙利使用和滥用其基本法，而波兰则无视其具有约束力的 1997 年宪法，同时创建了新的无形的非自由宪法。本文首先重点关注宪法规定的紧急制度及其（非）适用，探讨了在当前人类大流行危机期间如何进行。其次，它比较了议会的运作，因为下议院在宪法外的“流行病状态”期间混乱地通过了危机管理相关的综合立法和总统选举修正案。匈牙利议会在“危机的危险”下运作。然而，它仍然定期开展立法活动，因为紧急“立法”是根据 2020 年《冠状病毒法》通过政府法令完成的，这是违宪的。这些现象需要对匈牙利和波兰紧急立法和政府法令的性质、形式和内容进行深入调查。得出的结论是，在正常情况下，匈牙利和波兰为在紧急情况下指导当局而制定的宪法措施是足够的。在当前的政治和宪法环境以及 COVID-19 危机中，匈牙利和波兰一些重要紧急措施的形式和内容低于标准。这是欧洲社会认真对待匈牙利和波兰的非自由宪政主义的进一步警告信号。他们推动信封不会自行结束。这是欧洲社会认真对待匈牙利和波兰的非自由宪政主义的进一步警告信号。他们推动信封不会自行结束。这是欧洲社会认真对待匈牙利和波兰的非自由宪政主义的进一步警告信号。他们推动信封不会自行结束。