ABSTRACT

There has been recent interest in the idea that, when metaphysicians disagree over the truth of (say) ‘There are numbers’ or ‘Chairs exist’, their dispute is merely verbal. This idea has been taken to motivate quantifier variance, the view that the meanings of quantifier expressions vary across different ontological languages, and that each of these meanings is of equal metaphysical merit. I argue that quantifier variance cannot be upheld in light of natural language theorists’ analyses of quantifier expressions. The idea that metaphysicians are engaged in verbal disputes can be maintained only through alternative strategies that have nothing to do with quantifier expressions.

摘要

最近有人对这样一种观点感兴趣，即当形而上学家对（例如）“有数字”或“存在椅子”的真理存在分歧时，他们的争论只是口头上的。这个想法被用来激发量词变异e，即量词表达式的含义在不同的本体语言中有所不同，并且这些含义中的每一个都具有同等的形而上学价值。我认为，根据自然语言理论家对量词表达式的分析，不能支持量词方差。只有通过与量词表达无关的替代策略才能维持形而上学家参与口头争论的想法。