ABSTRACT

Moral abolitionists argue that ordinary moral discourse has downsides substantial enough to warrant abandoning the discourse in favour of some replacement(s). Their most common critique is that the ‘realist’ character of moral discourse inhibits important forms of self-awareness. Until recently, metaethicists had operated on the assumption that abolitionism depends on error theory. To this day, there has been no discernible recognition that well-established metaethical views might strongly support abolitionism, despite rejecting error theory. Here I argue that expressivism supports abolitionism and fits very poorly with quasi-realism. That is because (1) the quasi-realist strategy for defeating error theory helps abolitionists by entailing that they have no need of error theory, (2) expressivist interpretations of belief in realism strongly support abolitionist critiques from self-awareness, and (3) there is an inherent instability between expressivism and quasi-realism, while abolitionism and expressivism fit very nicely together.

摘要

道德废止主义者认为，普通的道德话语具有足够大的缺点，足以保证放弃话语以支持某些替代品。他们最常见的批评是道德话语的“现实主义”特征抑制了自我意识的重要形式。直到最近，元伦理学家一直在假设废奴主义依赖于错误理论。直到今天，尽管拒绝错误理论，但还没有明显的认识表明，完善的元伦理学观点可能会强烈支持废奴主义。在这里，我认为表现主义支持废奴主义并且与准现实主义非常不相符。那是因为 (1) 击败错误理论的准实在论策略通过推论他们不需要错误理论来帮助废奴主义者，