ABSTRACT

Adverbialism is the view that to have a conscious perceptual experience is to be consciously experiencing in a certain way, and that this way is not to be understood in relational or representational terms. We might compare what it is for a conscious being to be experiencing in a certain way with what it is for a string to be vibrating in a certain way. This paper makes a new case for adverbialism by appealing to the fact that we can pick out ways of experiencing by treating them as information-bearing signals. In both presenting and defending the view, it will be crucial that information is not the same as representational content, but can still concern objects and the properties of those objects. The resulting information-theoretic adverbialism can answer or deflect the most influential objections to adverbialism.

摘要

副词主义认为，有意识的知觉体验就是有意识地以某种方式体验，并且这种方式不能用关系或代表性的术语来理解。我们可以将有意识的存在以某种方式体验的情况与弦以某种方式振动的情况进行比较。本文通过诉诸以下事实为状语主义提供了一个新案例，即我们可以通过将体验方式视为承载信息的信号来挑选体验方式。在呈现和捍卫观点时，至关重要的是信息与表示内容不同，但仍然可以涉及对象和这些对象的属性。由此产生的信息论副词可以回答或转移对副词最有影响的反对意见。