is no ‘lesson’. He supports William Keach’s 1984 reading, particularly stressing the point of sonic development, recollection and propulsion running through the poem. Exploring the otherwise surprising fact of Shelley’s insistent admiration for Bacon as a poet, Wilson notices the way that Shelley appears to incorporate Bacon’s ‘sonic patternings’ in his own verse. An illuminating comparison of Shelley and Kant on the idea of cognition’s forgotten pleasure suggests again Shelley’s originality. The final emphasis lies on an insight that the vitality of poetry is crucially linked to its vulnerability and mortality: poetry lives only through reading. A brief ‘Coda’ returns to ‘The Triumph of Life’, with an exploration of one final meaning of ‘apprehension’: anxiety and foreboding (from the seventeenth century). Wilson finds that Shelley, surprisingly, does not deploy this sense, despite its regular use by Shakespeare and its occurrence in Wordsworth. For Wilson, this points to the ‘hope’ embodied in Shelley’s idea of apprehension; that the contrast between ‘life’ and ‘living on’ is not as ‘inimical’ as it at first appeared; that through the work of poetry, life may become, as ‘A Defence of Poetry’ states of emancipation, ‘wonderful and heavenly’. Wilson’s book is a triumph of dense, particularized readings organized into a tight, progressive argument; whilst demanding, it is eminently lucid and enjoyable. The book restores to us the singularity of Shelley’s thought, such that well-worn phrases from ‘A Defence’ (quoted in any undergraduate introduction to Romanticism) suddenly reappear in all their glimmering complexity. Wilson also brilliantly brings out Shelley’s consistent, knife-sharp response to intellectual history and his cultural present. There is a taut selectivity to the book – I for one would have liked a little more engagement with Rousseau, whose reworking of an eighteenth-century intellectual tradition of the ‘sentiment of existence’ is relevant to the phenomenological approach. And whilst the political ramifications of life in terms of slavery, patriarchy and republicanism were briefly and enticingly mentioned, an expansion of these would have been welcome, alongside a more explicit confrontation of Shelley’s ‘materialism’, atheism, and attitudes to love and sexuality. A larger question is posed about the revived canonical Romanticism emerging from scholars trained in Cambridge in the last decade or so. I refer here to recent (mainly CUP) monographs on single authors (in which confessedly I might include my own) presenting a formalist, philosophyrather than context-driven reading often built around a key term (gift, tautology, pleasure, life). Wilson makes some brief but suggestive comparisons with Wordsworth. Stepping back from the singularity of the individual poet, for a moment, requires us to ask how these key terms interact, what modern critical preferences they embody, and what questions we should ask about the unique or shared aspects of the historical formation of these and other writers.

中文翻译：

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气味与感性：维多利亚文学文化中的香水

不是'教训'。他支持威廉·基奇 (William Keach) 1984 年的阅读，特别强调贯穿全诗的声音发展、回忆和推动力。探索雪莱对培根作为诗人的坚持钦佩的其他令人惊讶的事实，威尔逊注意到雪莱似乎将培根的“声音模式”融入他自己的诗句中的方式。雪莱和康德关于认知被遗忘的快乐的观点的启发性比较再次表明雪莱的独创性。最后强调的是一种洞察力，即诗歌的生命力与其脆弱性和死亡密切相关：诗歌只有通过阅读才能生存。简短的“尾声”回到“生命的胜利”，探索“忧虑”的一个最终含义：焦虑和不祥（来自 17 世纪）。威尔逊惊奇地发现雪莱 尽管莎士比亚经常使用它并且它出现在华兹华斯，但它没有运用这种意义。对威尔逊而言，这表明雪莱的忧虑思想中蕴含着“希望”；“生活”和“继续生活”之间的对比并不像最初出现的那样“敌对”；通过诗歌的工作，生活可能会成为“诗歌辩护”解放状态，“美妙而天堂”。威尔逊的书是密集的、特殊的阅读的胜利，这些阅读被组织成一个紧凑、渐进的论点；虽然要求很高，但它非常清晰和令人愉快。这本书让我们恢复了雪莱思想的独特性，以至于“防御”中的陈词滥调（在任何本科浪漫主义导论中都引用过）突然以其闪烁的复杂性重新出现。威尔逊还出色地展现了雪莱一贯的风格，对思想史和他的文化现状的尖锐反应。这本书有严格的选择性——我本来希望更多地接触卢梭，他对 18 世纪“存在感”的知识传统的改造与现象学方法相关。虽然简单而诱人地提到了奴隶制、父权制和共和主义方面的生活政治后果，但随着雪莱的“唯物主义”、无神论以及对爱和性的态度的更明确的对抗，这些影响的扩大将是受欢迎的。一个更大的问题是关于过去十年左右在剑桥接受培训的学者复兴的经典浪漫主义。我在这里指的是最近（主要是 CUP）关于单一作者的专着（坦白地说，我可能包括我自己的）呈现形式主义的哲学，而不是通常围绕一个关键术语（礼物、同义反复、快乐、生活）建立的上下文驱动的阅读。威尔逊与华兹华斯做了一些简短但具有启发性的比较。暂时从个别诗人的独特性退后一步，需要我们问一下这些关键术语如何相互作用，它们体现了哪些现代批判性偏好，以及我们应该就这些和历史形成的独特或共享方面提出哪些问题？其他作家。