ABSTRACT Opposition minorities are often overlooked in presidential regimes, as they seem to lack the political clout to affect legislative outcomes. In this article, I challenge this claim, proving that opposition minorities play a significant role in the amendment and approval of executive initiatives at the committee stage. Using an original dataset that records legislators’ positions on politically relevant committee reports in Argentina (1983–2017), I show that opposition legislators frequently contribute to the president’s success in committee. This collaboration increases in more denationalised political contexts and for legislators aligned with the party of the provincial executive.

中文翻译：

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门口的少数派：反对派少数派的立法贡献和委员会制度。来自阿根廷的证据

摘要 反对派少数群体在总统政权中经常被忽视，因为他们似乎缺乏影响立法结果的政治影响力。在本文中，我挑战了这一说法，证明反对派少数群体在委员会阶段对行政倡议的修改和批准中发挥了重要作用。使用记录立法者在阿根廷（1983-2017 年）政治相关委员会报告中的立场的原始数据集，我表明反对派立法者经常为总统在委员会中的成功做出贡献。这种合作在更加非国家化的政治背景下以及与省行政党派结盟的立法者之间增加。