ABSTRACT This article answers the question to what extent authoritarian parliaments perform a legislative function. The analysis focuses on different institutional forms of power sharing and uses two large original datasets with 9.434 and 6.693 micro-level observations on legislative activity in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan between 1998 and 2016 to estimate which of these forms have the largest impact on parliamentary initiative. The analysis demonstrates a high average amount of parliamentary activity. Stimulating factors include institutional differentiation, internal fragmentation and a small opposition. Evidence also shows that initiative is reserved predominantly for loyalists who occupy legislative seats with delegated authority. A large opposition results in less overall activity because it implies that a higher proportion of powerful seats are occupied by members without support from the loyalist majority. The data also demonstrate, however, that loyalists exploit the threat of a large opposition by demanding policy concessions in exchange for loyalty.

中文翻译：

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专制政权中的议会倡议在欧亚立法机构中分享权力

摘要 本文回答了威权议会在多大程度上履行立法职能的问题。该分析侧重于不同的权力分享制度形式，并使用了两个大型原始数据集，分别对 1998 年至 2016 年俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦、乌克兰和吉尔吉斯斯坦的立法活动进行了 9.434 和 6.693 的微观观察，以估计这些形式中哪些对立法活动的影响最大。议会倡议。分析表明，议会活动的平均数量很高。刺激因素包括制度分化、内部分裂和小规模反对。证据还表明，主动权主要保留给拥有授权的立法席位的效忠者。大反对派导致整体活动减少，因为这意味着更高比例的有权势席位被成员占据，而没有得到大多数效忠派的支持。然而，数据还表明，忠诚者通过要求政策让步以换取忠诚，从而利用了大量反对派的威胁。