ABSTRACT This article expects to extend existing researches on the effect of political institutions on political corruption. Examining the case of post-Soeharto Indonesia, it argues that political corruption has become more rampant because of structural opportunities which incentivize corrupt practices. Employing veto player theory, this article illustrates how the conventional wisdom of installing more veto players has worked counterproductively to increase rather than to constrain political corruption. This is explained by the nature of the legislative process, which requires all players to agree before any legislative proposal can be enacted. Instead of ensuring checks and balances, the dispersion of more institutional veto players has been used as a political instrument to frustrate the executive. Bribery is used as a remedy for speeding up budget-making processes and getting priority policies approved. This article concludes that the veto player system needs to consider the nature of legislative processes in a specific context.

中文翻译：

---

重新审视否决权的优点：后苏哈托印度尼西亚的政治腐败

摘要 本文希望扩展关于政治制度对政治腐败影响的现有研究。研究后苏哈托印度尼西亚的案例，它认为政治腐败变得更加猖獗，因为结构性机会激励腐败行为。本文运用否决权理论，说明了安装更多否决权者的传统智慧如何适得其反地增加而不是限制政治腐败。这是由立法程序的性质所解释的，它要求所有参与者在制定任何立法提案之前达成一致。更多机构否决权的分散没有确保制衡，而是被用作挫败行政部门的政治工具。贿赂被用作加速预算制定过程和获得优先政策批准的补救措施。本文的结论是，否决权人制度需要考虑特定背景下立法程序的性质。