Abstract In [almost all of the analyses of global legal pluralism], which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes [the existence of “global legal pluralism”], or makes observations concerning [the “global Bukowina” regarding international] human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. (Hume 1738, book III, part I, ch. I) Pointing at David Hume’s powerful insight, this article aims to remind us of the necessity of sharply distinguishing between global legal pluralism as the description of recent factual developments, drawing attention for example, towards the massive increase in international actors, norms and tribunals as well as adjudicators on the one hand. And, on the other hand, as a different issue, the question of how we ought to deal with or even solve those legal conflicts (based on a (common) framework) resulting from these plural, overlapping legal claims. The “normative move” in the global legal pluralism debate asks for sufficient justification for its normative claims. This article concludes that the is – ought divide is respected at best if prescriptive proposals to solve legal conflicts are not termed “pluralistic.” Instead, I shall suggest, it is more precise to refer to a necessarily common framework which addresses the question as to how those conflicts should be resolved together or at least in a way acceptable to all parties. Finally, this article holds that this common framework depends hugely on the context. Thus, solutions are more likely to be found if we focus on specific contexts instead of drawing on universal solutions for different situations.

中文翻译：

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描述性与规定性的全球法律多元化：对大卫休谟的“是——应该分裂”的温和提醒

摘要 在我迄今为止遇到的[几乎所有对全球法律多元主义的分析]中，我一直指出，作者以通常的推理方式进行了一段时间，并确立了[“全球法律多元化的存在”法律多元化”]，或就[国际上的“全球布科维纳”]人类事务发表意见；突然间，我惊奇地发现，不是命题的通常组合，是和不是，我没有遇到与应该或不应该相关的命题。这种变化是难以察觉的；但是，这是最后的结果。(Hume 1738, book III, part I, ch. I) 这篇文章指出大卫·休谟的强大洞察力，旨在提醒我们必须明确区分全球法律多元化作为对最近事实发展的描述，例如，一方面提请注意国际行为者、规范和法庭以及裁判员的大量增加。而且，另一方面，作为一个不同的问题，我们应该如何处理甚至解决由这些复数、重叠的法律要求引起的那些法律冲突（基于（共同）框架）的问题。全球法律多元化辩论中的“规范性举措”要求为其规范性主张提供充分的理由。本文得出的结论是，如果解决法律冲突的规定性建议不被称为“多元化”，那么“是”和“应该”的划分就得到了最好的尊重。相反，我将建议，更准确的说法是提及一个必然共同的框架，该框架解决了如何一起解决这些冲突或至少以各方都可接受的方式解决这些冲突的问题。最后，本文认为，这个通用框架在很大程度上取决于上下文。因此，如果我们专注于特定的上下文，而不是针对不同情况采用通用的解决方案，则更有可能找到解决方案。