ABSTRACT The Hanoi summit between the US and North Korea failed not because of North Korea’s brinkmanship strategy or its miscalculation of the US position on the denuclearisation talks, but because of a fundamental issue: a dilemma of how much to yield in giving up its military capabilities to expedite the lifting of sanctions. The leadership in Pyongyang has concerns about the ‘deliverability’ of its promises to its domestic audience to ensure deterrence capabilities and economic recovery. The two-level game model explains why both sides keep minimising the range of options for the negotiations, increasing the risk that the talks will break down.

中文翻译：

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核裁军的困境：以朝鲜为例

摘要 美朝河内峰会的失败，不是因为朝鲜的边缘政策或对美国在无核化谈判中的立场判断错误，而是因为一个根本问题：放弃军事能力要让步多少的困境加快解除制裁。平壤领导层对其向国内民众做出的确保威慑能力和经济复苏的承诺的“兑现”表示担忧。两级博弈模型解释了为什么双方不断缩小谈判的选择范围，增加谈判破裂的风险。