either side to move toward a lessening of the tensions. And any friendly overture was usually quashed by the rapidly changing international situation, such as the takeover of the Saar region, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, or the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. It is odd, meanwhile, to observe the Nazi preoccupation with the Comintern, which had its seventh and final congress in the summer of 1935. Despite the fanfare around its new course of supporting left-wing coalition governments in democratic countries, the Communist International was in fact a rather limp organization, more a paper tiger than an international hub of revolutionary conspiracy. From many of the writings rendered here, it seems that the Nazis are well-nigh obsessed with the Comintern. For Hitler or Goebbels, the organization was an easy target to denounce, but its threat was largely a chimera in reality. It did perhaps come in useful as a foil, cementing alliances with other countries (Japan and Italy) that were more easily struck by means of an ostentatiously shared horror at an organization formally aimed at overthrowing the international order. Whereas Hitler and Goebbels might have been barely haunted by this specter, some of the lower level Nazis apparently took the threat more to heart, for a certain paranoia about it is palpable in some of the documents. While the historian cannot shake seeing the documents presented here through the prism of the 1939 Pact, Stalin’s imminent Great Terror casts a shadow over the reading of these documents as well. Its first steps were the two show-trials staged in Moscow in August 1936 and January 1937. Indeed, in late 1935, one still finds high-ranking Central Committee official Karl Radek’s advice to Stalin on the consequences of the Ethiopian War and other current events abroad, but by January 1937, he stood trial confessing to his allegedly hidden Trotskyite essence. And many of the other Soviet protagonists of this volume would soon be killed on Stalin’s orders. Thus, Tukhachevsky was killed in May or June 1937, while N.N. Krestinskii, G.G. Yagoda, and A.A. Rosengol'ts would stand trial in March 1938. For brevity’s sake, I have primarily limited myself above to outlining the significance of this collection through some telling documents of the late autumn of 1935. Those should already sufficiently indicate the great significance of this publication. The editors are to be applauded for their meticulous editing and annotation of the documents (and Tischler’s Einleitung [Introduction] is a feat of great erudition), as well as for supplying us a comprehensive index. Any research library, in my view, should purchase this collection, despite its prohibitive price. Given the size of the work, it is good value, even though few scholars will be able to afford to purchase for themselves the full set of books (in German, to boot), which will ultimately cost somewhere in the neighborhood of $1,000.

中文翻译：

---

戈尔什科夫海军上将：挑战美国海军的人

双方都朝着减轻紧张的方向前进。通常，迅速变化的国际形势（例如萨尔地区的接管，莱茵兰的军事化或西班牙内战的爆发）通常会取消任何友好的提议。同时，观察纳粹对共产国际的关注是很奇怪的，共产国际在1935年夏季举行了第七次也是最后一次代表大会。尽管围绕民主国家支持左翼联合政府的新路线大张旗鼓，但共产国际实际上，这是一个相当li行的组织，更多是纸老虎，而不是国际革命阴谋中心。从这里提供的许多著作来看，纳粹似乎对共产国际非常着迷。对于希特勒或Goebbels而言，该组织是一个容易谴责的目标，但是它的威胁实际上是一种嵌合体。它可能确实起到了挫败作用，巩固了与其他国家（日本和意大利）的联盟，而这种联盟由于对一个正式旨在推翻国际秩序的组织的公开的恐怖而轻易地遭到打击。希特勒和戈培尔人可能几乎不被这种幽灵所困扰，但一些下层纳粹显然更将这种威胁放在心上，因为在某些文件中对这种威胁有些偏执。尽管历史学家无法通过1939年《公约》的棱镜看到这里呈现的文件，但斯大林的迫在眉睫的“大恐怖”也为阅读这些文件蒙上了阴影。它的第一步是分别于1936年8月和1937年1月在莫斯科举行的两次表演秀。事实上，在1935年末，人们仍然发现中央高级官员卡尔·拉德克（Karl Radek）就埃塞俄比亚战争和国外其他时事的后果对斯大林的建议，但到1937年1月，他接受了审判，承认了他据称隐藏的托洛斯基派的本质。如此大量的其他苏联主角很快就会被斯大林的命令杀死。因此，图哈切夫斯基于1937年5月或6月被杀，而NN克里斯汀斯基，GG Yagoda和AA Rosengol'ts则将在1938年3月受审。为简洁起见，我主要是通过一些讲述来概述此系列的意义1935年深秋的文献。这些文献应该已经充分表明了该出版物的重要意义。称赞编辑人员的是对文档的精心编辑和注释（而Tischler的Einleitung [Introduction]则是博学多艺的壮举），并为我们提供了全面的索引。我认为，任何研究图书馆都应购买此收藏，尽管价格昂贵。鉴于书的大小，这是物有所值的，尽管很少有学者能够负担得起自己购买全套书籍的费用（用德语写成书），而这些书籍最终的价格大约在1,000美元左右。