The allocation of investment dollars between R&D (high-risk investments) and capital expenditure (low-risk investments), as a reflection of managers’ inclination to take risks, is an important issue in the field of corporate governance and corporate finance because of the different interests and responsibility orientations of key stakeholders. Based on the endogeneity of board governance and managerial risk taking, this article discusses the relationship between board governance and managerial risk taking using Instrumental Variables and Generalized Method of Moments. This article also discusses the effects of board governance on managerial risk taking in the long-term dynamic perspective. The results show that board governances have positive effects on managerial risk taking; that is, board governance would lead to higher investment in R&D expenditures and lower investment in capital expenditures, not only in the current year, but also over multiple years. This evidence suggests that effective board governance plays a significant role in promoting firm innovations.

中文翻译：

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董事会治理与管理风险承担：动态分析

在研发（高风险投资）和资本支出（低风险投资）之间分配投资美元，反映了管理者倾向于冒险，这是公司治理和公司融资领域的一个重要问题，因为关键利益相关者的不同利益和责任取向。基于董事会治理与管理风险承担的内生性，本文利用工具变量和广义矩方法探讨了董事会治理与管理风险承担之间的关系。本文还从长期动态的角度讨论了董事会治理对管理风险承担的影响。结果表明，董事会治理对管理风险承担有积极作用；也就是说，董事会治理将导致研发投入更高 D支出和资本支出的较低投资，不仅在当年，而且在多年内。该证据表明，有效的董事会治理在促进公司创新中起着重要作用。