ABSTRACT One significant feature of Jeong Yakyong’s丁若鏞 (1762–1836) thought is his deconstruction of Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130–1200) moral universe based on li 理 and qi 氣. For Zhu Xi, the world in its entirety was a moral place, but Jeong Yakyong distinguished nonmoral domains from the moral domain. One question that follows in pursuing a comparison of their philosophies on this topic is what each thinker meant by ‘moral’ and, in particular, whether they meant the same thing. In this paper, I delve deeper into this topic by comparing their respective perspectives on whether nonhuman animals are moral. Interestingly, they held exactly opposite views: Zhu Xi believed that certain actions on the part of nonhuman animals manifest moral values, whereas Jeong Yakyong claimed that none of the actions of nonhuman animals has moral value. In comparing their views, I introduce Mark Rowlands’ distinction between ‘moral subjects’ and ‘moral agents.’

中文翻译：

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动物是道德的吗？：朱Xi和郑雅京对非人类动物的看法

摘要Jeong Yakyong的丁若镛（1762-1836）思想的一个重要特征是他基于li理和气气解构了朱Xi的朱熹（1130–1200）道德宇宙。对于朱Xi来说，整个世界都是一个道德的地方，但是郑Yakyong将非道德的领域与道德的领域区分开了。在比较他们对此主题的哲学时，接下来的一个问题是每个思想家的“道德”是什么意思，尤其是他们是否意味着同一件事。在本文中，我将通过比较他们对非人类动物是否道德的观点来深入研究该主题。有趣的是，他们持完全相反的观点：朱Xi认为非人类动物的某些行为体现出道德价值，而郑雅京则声称非人类动物的行为都不具有道德价值。在比较他们的看法时，