ABSTRACT In this paper, I compare the idea of ‘substitution’, central to the later work of Emmanuel Levinas, to the idea of jinen hōni, or ‘natural acts’, proposed by Shinran Shōnin. For Levinas, ‘substitution’ meant the acceptance of responsibility for the suffering of the Other that one hasn’t caused, giving oneself up to ‘persecution’ and ‘accusation’ of the Other in absolute passivity. For Shinran, a similar passivity is implied by the unability of the ‘I’ to act in order to liberate itself from its conditioned existence, a result which can be achieved by giving up one’s own agency in favour of the Other. For both thinkers, ethical selfhood is thus attainable only by forsaking of one’s worldly ego, described in remarkably similar terms, even though their understanding of alterity itself is radically different.

中文翻译：

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列维纳斯和欣然：对方的力量

摘要在本文中，我将以取代伊曼纽尔·莱维纳斯（Emmanuel Levinas）后来的作品为核心的“替代”概念与辛兰·舍宁（ShinranShōnin）提出的“自然行为”（jinenhōni）概念进行了比较。对列维纳斯来说，“替代”意味着接受对他人未造成的痛苦的责任，以绝对被动的方式放弃对他人的“迫害”和“指责”。对于Shinran而言，“我”无法采取行动使自己摆脱其有条件的存在，也暗示了类似的消极情绪，这可以通过放弃自己的代理机构以支持另一方来实现。因此，对于这两个思想家来说，只有放弃一个世俗的自我（以极为相似的术语来描述），才能获得道德上的自我，即使他们对改变本身的理解存在根本不同。