Abstract A novel argument has recently been advanced against materialism—the view that human persons are identical to composite, material objects. The argument claims that pairs of people are not conscious and that the only viable explanation for why they are not is because pairs of people are not simple. The argument concludes that only a simple thing can be the subject of conscious states. In this paper, I offer an alternative explanation for why pairs of people are not conscious: pairs of people are not substances. I provide two characterizations of substantiality. The first proposal claims that substances have irreducible causal powers, and the second claims that substances cannot have other substances as proper parts. The alternative explanation based on these characterizations of substantiality shows that being conscious is compatible with materialism.

中文翻译：

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人，朴素和实质

摘要最近提出了一种反对唯物主义的新颖论点，即人与复合的物质对象相同。该论点声称，成对的人不是有意识的，而为什么他们没有意识的唯一可行解释是因为成对的人并不简单。该论点得出结论，只有简单的事物才能成为意识状态的主体。在本文中，我提供了另一种解释，说明了为什么人们对人们没有意识：人们对人们不是物质。我提供了两个实质性描述。第一个建议主张物质具有不可还原的因果力，第二个主张主张物质不能具有其他物质作为适当的部分。