Abstract D. M. Armstrong famously claims that deterministic laws of nature are contingent relations between universals and that his account can also be straightforwardly extended to irreducibly probabilistic laws of nature. For the most part, philosophers have neglected to scrutinize Armstrong’s account of probabilistic laws. This is surprising precisely because his own claims about probabilistic laws make it unclear just what he takes them to be. We offer three interpretations of what Armstrong-style probabilistic laws are, and argue that all three interpretations are incompatible either with some feature of Armstrong’s broader metaphysics or with essential features of his account of laws (or both).

中文翻译：

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阿姆斯特朗论自然概率定律

摘要DM阿姆斯特朗（DM Armstrong）著名地宣称，确定性自然定律是普遍性之间的偶然关系，他的解释也可以直接扩展到不可约概率的自然定律。在大多数情况下，哲学家忽略了仔细检查阿姆斯特朗对概率法的解释。正是由于他自己对概率定律的主张，使得他不清楚他将其定为何种状态，这一点令人惊讶。我们对阿姆斯特朗式概率定律是什么提供了三种解释，并认为这三种解释都与阿姆斯特朗广义形而上学的某些特征或他对法律的解释的本质特征（或两者）都不相容。