Abstract A familiar Epicurean argument for the conclusion that death (i.e., being dead) is not bad for those who die goes like this. The dead cannot experience anything, including being dead and its effects. But something is bad for an individual only if that person can experience it or its effects. Therefore, death is not bad for those who die. In this article, I consider several alleged counterexamples to this argument's second premise, along with some responses to them. The responses are not entirely without merit, as we will see. However, I contend that even if none of the cases cited are straightforward counterexamples to the Epicurean premise, they can be used to challenge it indirectly. I conclude that this familiar Epicurean argument is unsound.

中文翻译：

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死亡，背叛和守护天使

摘要一个著名的伊壁鸠鲁论据提出这样的结论，即死亡（即死亡）对死者来说并不坏，这是这样的。死者无法经历任何事情，包括死者及其影响。但是，只有对一个人有经验的事物或其影响，某些事物才对他不利。因此，死亡对于死者来说并不坏。在本文中，我考虑了该论据第二个前提的几个所谓的反例，以及对它们的一些回应。正如我们将看到的，这些回应并非完全没有优点。但是，我认为即使引用的案例都不是Epicurean前提的直接反例，也可以用来间接挑战它。我得出结论，这种熟悉的伊壁鸠鲁论据是不正确的。