Abstract It is sometimes argued that conceptualism cannot explain (dis)agreements concerning matters of personal taste because it treats sentences involving predicates of taste as indexical. I aim to weaken this charge. Given the idea that people sometimes use indexical sentences to express (dis)agreements about taste, two kinds of (dis)agreement are distinguished, namely doxastic and non-doxastic. Taste (dis)agreements are better explained in terms of the later kind, in which case they become amenable to contextualist treatment. It is argued that if something instantiates a taste property (like being tasty for A), it has to instantiate a corresponding attitudinal property (like being liked by A). Based on this, utterances of taste sentences express propositions that concern tastiness of something (e.g., that X is tasty for A) and these propositions entail other propositions that concern non-doxastic attitudes the speakers bear toward something (e.g., that X is liked by A). One speaker is claimed to (dis)agree with another speaker provided their respective entailed propositions feature (in)compatible non-doxastic attitudes. Although this explanation is similar to hybrid accounts that are currently growing in popularity, it departs from them in some notable respects.

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关于品味，语境主义和非固执态度的对话

摘要有时有人争辩说，概念主义无法解释关于个人品味问题的（不一致）协议，因为它把涉及品味谓词的句子视为索引。我旨在削弱这一指控。考虑到人们有时使用索引语句来表达关于品味的（不同意）协议的想法，区分了两种（不同意）协议，即，近义和非义义。味觉（异议）协议可以在后一种类型中得到更好的解释，在这种情况下，它们可以接受情境主义的对待。有人认为，如果某个事物实例化了一个味觉属性（例如对A而言是美味的），则它必须实例化一个相应的态度属性（如被A所喜欢）。基于此，品味句子的表达表达了与某物的美味有关的命题（例如，X对于A而言是美味的），这些命题还包含其他与说话者对某事持非固定态度有关的命题（例如X被A喜欢）。据称，一名发言人与另一名发言人（不同意）一致，只要他们各自提出的主张具有（不兼容）非固定态度。尽管此解释类似于当前越来越流行的混合帐户，但在某些显着方面偏离了混合帐户。