Abstract Three thoughts strongly influence recent work on sensory imagination, often without explicit articulation. The image thought says that all mental states involving a mental image are imaginative. The attitude thought says that, if there is a distinctive imaginative attitude, it is a single, monolithic attitude. The function thought says that the functions of sensory imagination are identical or akin to functions of other mental states such as judgment or belief. Taken together, these thoughts create a theoretical context within which eliminativism appears attractive. Eliminativism is the idea that we need not refer to a distinctive attitude in order to characterize sensory imagination: the attitudes involved in other states provide all the resources we need. Peter Langland-Hassan’s account of sensory imagination provides an example of such eliminativism. Via close examination of this account, I make manifest the three thoughts and their collective tendency to support eliminativism. I argue that all three are dubious, and that we should reject eliminativism; we need a distinctive imaginative attitude if we are to adequately explicate sensory imagination.

中文翻译：

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刻画想象力的态度

摘要三个思想强烈地影响着最近在感觉想象方面的工作，通常没有明确的表达。形象思想说，涉及精神形象的所有精神状态都是想象力。态度思想说，如果有独特的想象态度，那就是单一的整体态度。功能思想表明，感觉想象的功能与其他精神状态（如判断力或信念）的功能相同或相似。这些思想共同创造了一种理论背景，在这种背景下，消除自我主义显得很有吸引力。消极主义是一种观念，我们不必为了表现感官想象而指称独特的态度：其他国家所涉及的态度提供了我们所需要的所有资源。彼得·兰格朗·哈桑（Peter Langland-Hassan）对感官想象力的描述提供了这种自我主义的例子。通过仔细研究这个说法，我可以证明这三种思想及其支持消除主义的集体倾向。我认为这三个都是可疑的，我们应该拒绝种族主义。如果要充分说明感官想象力，我们需要一种独特的想象力态度。