Abstract Moderate invariantism is the orthodox semantics for knowledge attributions (i.e., sentences of the form ⌜S knows/doesn’t know that Φ⌝). In recent years it has fallen out of favour, in large part because it fails to explain why ordinary speakers have the intuition that some utterances of knowledge attributions are felicitous and others infelicitous (felicity intuitions) in several types of cases. To address this issue moderate invariantists have developed a variety of what I call non-semantic theories (aka error theories) which they claim account for the relevant felicity intuitions independently of moderate invariantist semantics. Some critics have responded by arguing that these non-semantic theories are implausible for one or more of the following reasons: (i) they do not have a basis in empirical data or established theory; (ii) they do not account for all of the relevant felicity intuitions; (iii) they are ad hoc; or (iv) they in fact explain too many felicity intuitions and thus undermine the case for moderate invariantism. I develop a new non-semantic theory––projective adaptivism––that I argue escapes issues (i) to (iv) above.

中文翻译：

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投射适应主义

摘要适度的不变性是知识属性（即⌜S知道/不知道Φ⌝形式的句子）的正统语义。近年来，它不受欢迎，这在很大程度上是因为它无法解释为什么普通讲话者的直觉认为，在某些类型的情况下，某些知识属性的言语是恰当的，而另一些则是无礼的（凭直觉）。为了解决这个问题，中度不变主义者发展了各种各样的我称之为非语义学的理论（又称错误理论），他们声称它们独立于中度不变主义语义而解释了相关的直觉。一些批评者对此做出回应，认为这些非语义理论由于以下一个或多个原因是不可信的：（i）它们没有经验数据或既定理论的基础；（ii）他们并没有考虑所有相关的直觉；（iii）它们是临时的；（iv）他们实际上解释了太多的直觉，从而破坏了中度不变的理由。我提出了一种新的非语义学理论-投射适应主义-我认为它可以逃避上述问题（i）至（iv）。