Abstract Ever since John Perry's developments in the late 70s, it is customary among philosophers to take de se contents as essentially tied to the explanation of action. The target explanation appeals to a subject-specific notion of de se content capable of capturing behavioural differences in central cases. But a subject-specific de se content leads us, I argue, to a subject-specific notion of intentional action that prevents basic forms of generalisation. Although this might be seen as a welcome revision of our pre-theoretical conceptions, I propose, instead, a strategy to circumvent this rather unexpected result: to reject subject-specific de se contents in favour of subject-specific ways of thinking that do not enter into the content of one's attitudes.

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内容和动作概述

摘要自从约翰·佩里（John Perry）在70年代后期的发展以来，哲学家习惯将本质上与行动的解释联系在一起的内容视为哲学家的习惯。目标解释吸引了能够捕捉主要案例中的行为差异的主题内容特定概念。但是，我认为，特定于主题的本质内容将我们引向故意行为的特定主题概念，该概念阻止了概括的基本形式。尽管这可能被视为对我们理论前概念的欢迎修订，但我还是提出了一种规避这一相当意外的结果的策略：拒绝特定于主题的定义内容，转而采用特定于主题的思维方式进入一个人的态度的内容。