Aristotle is traditionally read as dividing animal souls into three parts (nutritive, perceptive, and thinking), while dividing human souls into four parts (a rational part, with theoretical and practical subparts, and non-rational part, with nutritive and desiderative subparts). But careful reading of Nicomachean Ethics 1.13 suggests that he divides the human soul into three parts – the nutritive, the theoretical, and the “practical” – but allows that the “practical” part is sometimes divided, as in akratic and other non-virtuous agents. In a fully virtuous agent, practical reason is the proper form of – and so in the hylomorphic sense one with – the desiring part of soul. It is thus contingent how many parts a given soul has, three being the norm, but four being common. Reading Aristotle this way is supported by appeal to his cosmology, where the superlunary world provides the unitary norm, and his embryology, where male offspring are the norm (in which menstrual fluid is fully mastered by the male principle) but female offspring commonly occur when the menstrual fluid (analogous to desire) is only partially mastered by the male principle (analogous to practical reason).

中文翻译：

---

亚纯德：亚里士多德的宇宙学，胚胎学和道德发展

传统上将亚里士多德理解为将动物的灵魂分为三个部分（营养，感知和思考），而将人类的灵魂分为四个部分（理性的部分，具有理论和实践的子部分，非理性的部分，具有营养和期望的子部分） 。但是仔细阅读《尼科马奇伦理学1.13》后，他将人类的灵魂分为营养，理论和“实践”三个部分，但允许“实践”部分有时被分割，例如在自然语言和其他非道德语言中代理商。在一个完全道德的主体中，实际的原因是灵魂所希望的部分的正确形式，在同形上也是如此。因此，取决于一个给定的灵魂有多少部分，这三个是常态，但四个是共同的。以这种方式阅读亚里斯多德的方法得到了他的宇宙学的支持，