Many believe that the mental activity of reasoning, through which we form, revise and discard attitudes like beliefs and intentions, is the weighing of and responding to normative reasons. In Practical Shape, Jonathan Dancy has recently developed the most detailed and systematic defence of this view, often referred to as the Reasons View. In this essay, I respond to Dancy’s account of the nature and goodness of reasoning. I argue that Dancy does not offer a sufficiently explanatory account of the nature of reasoning and that the standard of evaluation for reasoning he proposes seems too coarse-grained. Whether a theory of reasoning in terms of normative reasons can be developed as an alternative to the Rule-Following View, which has largely dominated the recent debate, remains to be seen, even if Dancy immensely advances the project. As rational beings, we have the ability to make decisions and form judgements through deliberation or reasoning. Though many of the beliefs and intentions we hold are the result of sub-personal, automatic mental processes which we have no direct control over, we are not entirely subject to these mechanisms that merely happen to us. We can actively engage the capacity to reason, which is arguably distinctively human and makes us subject to warranted criticism if we get things wrong. This raises two questions. What is reasoning, and what is it to reason correctly, or well? The recent debate on the nature and correctness of reasoning is dominated by three positions. First, according to what we may call the RuleFollowing View, which has been notably advanced by John Broome (2013, ch.13–16, 2014a, 2014b), reasoning is essentially a rule-following activity. The rules of reasoning derive from coherence requirements of rationality and your reasoning is correct, on this view, in so far as you correctly follow correct rules. Second, according to the Fittingness View, reasoning is an activity guided by the aim of getting fitting attitudes, that is, permissible intentions and true beliefs (McHugh andWay 2018a, 2018b). Reasoning is good when it achieves this aim. And third, according to the so-called Reasons View, reasoning is (a way of) responding to normative reasons. Your reasoning is good or correct when, put roughly, you respond correctly to normative reasons. Many moral philosophers and epistemologists seem to assume some version of the latter view, but no detailed account has been developed that offers a viable alternative to the other two views. Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Shape (2018) is an illuminating, elaborate defence of a version of the Reasons View. The aim of the book is to propose a unified theory of reasoning, one

中文翻译：

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推理是对理性的回应吗？

许多人认为，我们通过其形成，修改和抛弃诸如信念和意图之类的态度的推理活动是对规范性理由的权衡和回应。在《实用形态》中，乔纳森·丹西（Jonathan Dancy）最近开发了对此视图的最详细和系统的辩护，通常称为“原因视图”。在本文中，我回应了丹西关于推理的本质和优点的论述。我认为，戴西（Dancy）对推理的性质没有提供足够的解释，他提出的推理评估标准似乎太粗糙了。即使丹西极大地推动了该项目，是否可以发展出一种基于规范性理由的推理理论来替代在很大程度上主导着最近辩论的规则遵循观点。作为理性的人，我们有能力通过审议或推理做出决策并作出判断。尽管我们持有的许多信念和意图是我们无法直接控制的亚个人的，自动的心理过程的结果，但我们并不完全受制于仅发生在我们身上的这些机制。我们可以积极地发挥推理的能力，这种能力可以说是人类的独特之处，如果我们弄错了事情，那么我们就必须受到批评。这提出了两个问题。什么是推理，正确地推理还是很好地推理？最近关于推理的性质和正确性的辩论主要由三个立场决定。首先，根据我们所谓的RuleFollowing View（规则遵循视图），John Broome（2013，ch.13–16，2014a，2014b）对其进行了改进，推理本质上是遵循规则的活动。推理规则源自合理性的连贯性要求，并且就此观点而言，只要您正确遵循正确的规则，您的推理就是正确的。其次，根据Fitfitness观点，推理是一种以获取合适态度为目标的活动，即允许的意图和真实信念（McHugh andWay 2018a，2018b）。当达到这个目的时，推理就很好。第三，根据所谓的“理性观”，推理是对规范理性的一种回应。粗略地说，当您正确地回应规范性原因时，您的推理是正确的或正确的。许多道德哲学家和认识论者似乎都采用了后一种观点的某种形式，但是没有详细的说明可以为另两种观点提供可行的选择。乔纳森·丹西（Jonathan Dancy）的《实用形态》（2018）是对《原因视图》版本的启发性，精心设计的辩护。这本书的目的是提出一种统一的推理理论，